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Introduction: the Manichean Problem
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are both primary 
drivers and facilitating technologies of globalization—and thereby, of ex-
ponentially expanding possibilities of cross-cultural encounters.  Currently, 
over one billion persons throughout the planet have access to the Web: of 
these, Asian users constitute 35.8% of the Web population, while Europeans 
make up 28.3 % of world users—and North Americans only 20.9% (Internet 
World Stats, 2007).
Our histories teach us all too well that such encounters—especially con-
cerning potentially global ethical norms—always run the risk of devolving 
into more destructive rather than emancipatory events.  Speciﬁcally, these 
encounters risk pulling us into one of two contradictory positions.  First of 
all, naïve ethnocentrisms too easily issue in imperialisms that remake “the 
Other” in one’s own image—precisely by eliminating the irreducible differ-
ences in norms and practices that deﬁne distinctive cultures. Second, these 
imperialisms thereby inspire a relativistic turn to the sheerly local—precise-
ly for the sake of preserving local identities and cultures. 
Hence the general problem: how we might foster a cross-cultural com-
munication for a global ICE that steers between the two Manichean polari-
ties of ethnocentric imperialism and fragmenting relativism? 
A Global ICE: Basic Requirements
This difﬁculty is not new with ICTs and ICE—but is complicated by 
the fact that ICTs, most especially the Internet, embed and foster the cul-
tural norms and communicative preferences of their Western roots (see Ess 
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2006a, 2006b, 2007b.)  By the same token, as Soraj Hongladarom points out, 
until relatively recently, Computer Ethics have remained largely the work of 
Western ethicists (2007, 110).  
But of course, there are sharp contrasts between the basic assumptions 
underlying Western ICE and those deﬁning world traditions and cultures 
as shaped by Confucian thought, Buddhism, Indigenous traditions, etc. To 
begin with, in contrast with the modern Western emphasis on the atomistic 
individual as a primary reality, many of these traditions understand human 
beings as relational beings, ones whose identity and reality essentially turns 
on their relationships with others in the larger community (and, perhaps, na-
ture and/or divinity itself).   So Barbara Paterson suggests that in general, “In 
African philosophy, a person is deﬁned through his or her relationships with 
other persons, not through an isolated quality such as rationality…” (2007, 
157). This means in turn that “African thought sees a person as a being un-
der construction whose character changes as the relations to other persons 
change.” (ibid)  This notion of the human subject as a relational being is 
likewise found in Confucian thought (see Ames and Rosemont 1998, 49).
These irreducible differences thus work to deﬁne the differences between 
cultures—and thereby between individuals as shaped by these cultures. 
These foundational differences are thereby essential to our identities as cul-
tures and members of cultures. Given that persons and cultures have a basic 
right to identity (Ess 2006a), this immediately means that we are obliged to 
honor and foster the irreducible differences that deﬁne our individual and 
cultural identities. At the same time, however, as we seek to develop a global 
ICE, we must do so in ways that simultaneously foster and sustain a shared 
ethos or set of ethical practices.
How far ought we go towards “the Other”?
We must ask still one more question before proceeding to develop a glo-
bal ICE: How far do we want / need / ought to go to meet “the Other”?  This 
question is central because our responses to it will determine how far we 
may remain satisﬁed with an ethics that emphasizes shared assumptions and 
obligations only—and how far we may be willing, if not required, to take 
up additional ethical obligations necessary in order to honor and foster the 
irreducible differences that deﬁne our cultural and individual identities.
In the following, I begin to sketch out the characteristics of each of these 
responses. 
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Minimal standards—emphasis on commonalities
What we can think of as a set of minimal ethical standards for a global 
ICE emphasize commonalities more than differences for the sake of largely 
pragmatic economic interests.
These minimal standards begin with what Johnny Søraker has described 
as pragmatic arguments, i.e., arguments that appeal to our shared economic 
interests.  Such arguments are strong candidates for inclusion in a global 
ICE, precisely because they largely bypass foundational cultural and po-
litical differences (2006). Such arguments seem to work: for example, as a 
condition of joining the World Trade Organization, China has agreed to the 
Human Subjects Protections endorsed by the World Health Organization as 
required for medical research: even though these protections were quite al-
ien to the philosophical foundations of Chinese cultures and earlier medical 
practices, the economic advantages of WTO membership were too great for 
China to turn down (Döring, 2003). 
Moreover, we may expect a global ICE to include agreements on identi-
cal values and standards because globalization—as fueled by ICTs them-
selves—fosters a cultural hybridization and the creation of “third identities” 
(i.e., syntheses of two distinct cultural values, practices, beliefs, etc.) that 
represent precisely a shared, global identity. One of the clearest examples 
of such a third identity is in the domain of privacy.  As a number of com-
mentators have observed, young people in Asian countries—speciﬁcally 
Japan, Thailand, and China—increasingly insist on a Western-like practice 
of individual privacy, one that directly contradicts traditional Asian notions 
(see Nakada & Tamura 2005, Rananand 2007, and Lü 2005, respectively). 
Clearly, young people in these countries are inﬂuenced by their exposure to 
Western notions of individual privacy: and, insofar as there is an increas-
ingly identical set of understandings and values surrounding notions of indi-
vidual privacy in both East and West, then we may expect that a global ICE 
will be able to develop a single, (quasi-) universal set of norms and practices 
for protecting that privacy. 
Maximal standards: resonance
But insofar as the irreducible differences deﬁning diverse cultures and 
identities are not eradicated or overshadowed by such hybridizations, we are 
left with the difﬁculty of crafting a global ICE that will preserve such differ-
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ences. As I’ve suggested, to do so depends in part on how far we believe we 
ought / need / want to go beyond pragmatic relationships that emphasize our 
shared commonalities—and thus, how far we are prepared to engage “the 
Other” as Other, i.e., precisely in ways that recognize, respect, indeed foster 
our irreducible differences.
A central model for encountering “the Other” in this second way is pro-
vided by the Japanese Buddhist and comparative philosopher Kitarō Nish-
ida’s understanding of resonance. This notion of resonance, we will see, is 
of interest in part because it represents a notion that is shared between such 
Western philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, and such Eastern traditions as 
Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist thought. 
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Nishida and resonance 
Nishida draws on the language of German philosophy, emphasizing that 
to preserve our identities as irreducibly distinct from one another, our rela-
tionships with one another always take place across the difference of “ab-
solute opposites” [Entgegengesetzter].  But if only sheer difference deﬁnes 
our relationship—then there will be no connection or unity [Vereinigung]. 
To describe human relationships as a structure that holds together both ir-
reducible difference and relationship, Nishida turns to the term and concept 
of resonance.  As with its musical deﬁnition, a resonant relationship entails a 
connection that simultaneously sustains the irreducible differences required 
to keep our identities and awareness separate: “The mutual [gegenseitige] 
relationship of absolute opposites [Entgegengesetzter] is a resonant [hankyō] 
meeting or response. … Here we encounter a unity of I and You and at the 
same time a real contradiction.” (Nishida 1988, 391f.; cited in Elberfeld 
2002, 138f.  Translation from the German by CE)
As I have shown elsewhere, resonance and an afﬁliated pluralism are 
central to the work of eco-feminist Karen Warren (1990) and speciﬁcally the 
information ethics of Larry Hinman (1998). Similar notions of resonance 
emerge in contemporary political philosophy, most speciﬁcally in the work 
of Charles Taylor (2002) and his notion of strong complementarity (see Ess, 
2006c). Such complementarity, moreover, is not restricted to other human 
beings.  We may further seek—or believe ourselves required to seek—such 
resonance with the larger community, and/or the natural order, and/or per-
haps even divinity (so far as we believe divinity to exist). Broadly speaking, 
the further we understand our interrelationship with “the Other” to extend, 
the more extensive our ethical obligations will become.
Between Nishida and Taylor, then, we can discern models of resonance 
and complimentarity for our engagements with “the other”—whether in hu-
man, natural, and/or divine form—that insist on preserving and fostering the 
irreducible differences that deﬁne our identities as distinct from one another, 
while simultaneously sustaining relations that, ideally, foster the ﬂourishing 
of all. 
This understanding of the sorts of harmonies we are to strive for, moreover, 
guide the ethical and political thought of a range of world traditions, includ-
ing Aristotle, Confucian thought, African thought, etc.  At the same time, this 
emphasis on harmony is likewise a theme shared by contemporary virtue eth-
ics, ecofeminism and environmental ethics.  Hence these notions of resonance, 
complimentarity, and harmony appear to offer a kind of ethical lingua franca 
that may serve as common grounds for a global ICE.  But again, we will 
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also see that the ethical demands and obligations these notions entail go well 
beyond those that follow from an initial—but minimal—emphasis on com-
monalities alone, as we seek to foster engagements with “the Other” via ICTs 
distributed globally in ways that preserve the irreducible differences at work 
in such resonant relationships.  
To see how this is so, I ﬁrst turn to the possible ways—ﬁrst in theory and 
then in praxis—of developing such a global ICE, one that constructs a plural-
ism constituted by shared ethical norms and values alongside multiple interpre-
tations or applications of these values as refracted through—and thus reﬂecting 
and preserving—irreducibly different cultural traditions, practices, etc.  
Ethical pluralism West and East
The difﬁculty of developing an ethics that works across diverse cultures 
and traditions is an ancient problem: the ancients in both Eastern and West-
ern traditions have developed often highly sophisticated ways of resolving 
the apparently conﬂicting demands between agreement and difference. At 
the same time, the ancient Western and Eastern solutions in fact closely re-
semble one another in several fundamental ways.  
Ethical Pluralism West: 
Plato, Aristotle, phronesis and “cybernetic pluralism” 
Both Plato and Aristotle—and subsequently, Aquinas—responded to this 
complex requirement in at least two key ways.  To begin with, Plato develops 
a view that I have characterized as “interpretive pluralism” (Ess, 2006c).  On 
this view, as elaborated especially in The Republic, we may conjoin shared 
ethical norms with irreducible differences by recognizing that diverse ethical 
practices may represent distinctive interpretations or applications of those 
shared norms.  Such differences, that is, do not necessarily mean, as ethical 
relativists would argue, that there are no universally legitimate ethical norms 
or values: rather, such differences may mean only that a given norm or value 
is applied or understood in distinctive ways—precisely as required by the 
details of a given context as shaped by a particular tradition, cultural norms, 
and practices.  
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Aristotle builds on Plato’s teaching in several ways, beginning with his 
notion of pros hen or “focal” equivocals.  Such equivocals stand as linguis-
tic middle grounds between a homogenous univocation (which requires that 
a term have one and only one meaning) and a pure equivocation (as a sin-
gle term may have multiple but entirely unrelated meanings—for example, 
“bat” can refer both to a winged mammal and a wooden stick used in base-
ball).  Pros hen or focal equivocals, by contrast, are terms with clearly dif-
ferent meanings that simultaneously relate or cohere with one another as 
both point towards a shared or focal notion that anchors the meaning of 
each. Aristotle uses the example of “healthy” to illustrate his point: “ … the 
term ‘healthy’ always relates to health (either as preserving it or as produc-
ing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it ….” (Metaphysics 1003b2-4; 
cf. 1060b37-1061a7).  So we could say, for example, that a particular diet 
is healthy
1
—and good kidney functioning may also be said to be healthy
2
: 
but the two terms are not univocals—that is, they do not have precisely the 
same meaning. On the contrary: with healthy
1
 we mean that the diet contrib-
utes to the state of being healthy—while healthy
2
 means that good kidney 
function is a reﬂection of the state of being healthy.  At the same time, how-
ever, precisely because healthy
1  
and healthy
2
 refer to the same “state of being 
healthy” that, as a shared focal point, thus grounds their meanings—their 
differences in meaning are thus conjoined with a coherence or connection 
alongside these differences. 
For Aristotle, our ability to negotiate the complex ambiguities of pros hen 
equivocals is afﬁliated with a particular kind of practical judgment, i.e., phro-
nesis.  Just as we can recognize and appropriately utilize terms that hold differ-
ent but related meanings—so phronesis allows us to take a general principle 
(as the ethical analogue to the focal term ground two pros hen equivocals) 
and discern how it may be interpreted or applied in different ways in different 
contexts (as the ethical analogues to the two pros hen equivocals—i.e., that 
are irreducibly different and yet inextricably connected).  But what phronesis 
thereby makes possible is an ethical pluralism that recognizes precisely that 
shared ethical principles and norms will necessarily issue in diverse ethical 
judgments and interpretations, as required by irreducibly different contexts 
deﬁned by an extensive range of ﬁne-grained details. 
In fact, Aristotle’s understanding of phronesis and thus of ethical pluralism 
is intimately connected with a central component of computation—namely, 
cybernetics. Most of us are familiar with the term—as originally developed by 
Norbert Wiener—as referring to the ability of computer systems to self-regu-
late and self-correct their processes through various forms of feedback mecha-
nisms.  But we need reminding here that “cybernetics” is derived from Plato’s 
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use of the cybernetes. The cybernetes is a steersman, helmsman, or pilot, and 
Plato uses the cybernetes as a primary model of ethical judgment—speciﬁ-
cally, our ability to discern and aim towards the ethically-justiﬁed path in the 
face of a wide range of possible choices.  So Plato has Socrates observe in The 
Republic: 
… a ﬁrst-rate pilot [cybernetes] or physician, for example, feels the difference between 
the impossibilities and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others 
go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. (Republic, 
360e-361a, Bloom trans.; cf. Republic I, 332e-c; VI, 489c.)
“Cybernetics,” then, means more originally the capability of making ethi-
cal judgments in the face of speciﬁc and diverse contexts, complete with 
the ability to self-correct in the face of error and/or new information. This is 
to say, the cybernetes, as a model of ethical self-direction, thereby embod-
ies and exempliﬁes the sort of ethical judgment that Aristotle subsequently 
identiﬁes in terms of phronesis—i.e., precisely the ability to discern what 
general principles may apply in a particular context—and how they are to be 
interpreted to apply within that context as deﬁned by a near-inﬁnite range of 
ﬁne-grained, ethically relevant details.  
Bridge notions with Eastern thought:  
pluralism, harmony, and resonance
These notions of judgment and pluralism are found throughout diverse 
religious and philosophical traditions—including, for example, Islam (Eick-
elman 2003) as well as Confucian thought (Chan 2003).  Moreover, Rolf 
Elberfeld (2002) has extensively described how the metaphors of harmony 
and resonance appear in both Western and Eastern traditions, beginning with 
Plato’s account of the role of music as critical to education in The Republic 
(401d). The metaphors of resonance and harmony, moreover, are clearly 
structures of pluralism: that is, these notions explicitly entail structures of 
connection alongside and in the face of irreducible difference. Speciﬁcally, 
the Chinese term ying (resonance) means precisely “a conjunction [Zugleich] 
of unity [Vereinigung] and division [Trennung]” (Elberfeld 2002, 132).
Finally, Elberfeld demonstrates that these understandings of harmony, 
resonance, and a correlative ethical pluralism are also found in both an-
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cient and contemporary Daoism and Buddhism (2002, 137f.) And, as we 
have seen, the highly inﬂuential Japanese comparative philosopher Nishida 
Kitarō takes up the Japanese version of resonance [hankyō] as key to our 
knowing one another as human beings. 
Hence it is clear that these notions of pluralism and resonance are shared 
cross-culturally—but, unlike simple commonalities, these notions further 
include the ability to articulate and preserve irreducible differences. 
Pluralism in Contemporary ICE
Indeed, there are at least two examples of such pluralism operating in con-
temporary theoretical work, beginning with Terrell Ward Bynum’s synthesis 
of the work of Norbert Wiener and Luciano Floridi in what Bynum calls 
“ﬂourishing ethics.” (2006) Similarly, Luciano Floridi (2006) has developed 
a conception of what he calls a “lite” information ontology—precisely with 
a view towards avoiding a cultural imperialism, on the one hand (resulting 
from unilaterally and homogenously applying a single ethical framework 
across all cultures), while also avoiding, on the other hand, a merely rela-
tivist insistence on a local framework only, one that would thereby remain 
fragmented and isolated from other cultures and frameworks, as the effort 
to preserve their irreducible differences would (mistakenly) insist on avoid-
ing all shared, putatively universal norms and values. A “lite” ontology can 
serve as a shared framework that allows precisely for a pluralistic diversity 
of understandings and applications of a shared notion of informational pri-
vacy, as, in effect, the focal, pros hen notion referred to by speciﬁc under-
standings and implementations of privacy within speciﬁc—and irreducibly 
different—cultural settings.  
In addition to strong notions of pluralism in these prominent ICE theo-
ries, a number of important examples instantiate pluralism in praxis.
Pluralism in Praxis
As a ﬁrst example: Bernd Carsten Stahl develops “critical reﬂexivity” as 
a procedurally-oriented approach to ICE, one intended precisely to avoid 
the Manichean polarities of homogenization and fragmentation that confront 
any effort to develop ethical norms to be shared across cultures. In doing so, 
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Stahl takes up the central difﬁculties of deﬁning ‘emancipation’ in a way that 
would work cross-culturally.  This requires a formal approach that empha-
sizes creating “…procedures that allow the individuals or groups in question 
to develop their own vision of emancipation or empowerment” (2006, 105). 
Such a procedural approach has the advantage that “the critical researcher 
will not prescribe certain features that she believes to be emancipatory, but 
that she gives the research subjects the chance to deﬁne their version of 
emancipation” (ibid, emphasis added, CE).
Such critical reﬂexivity and its allied procedural approach thereby issues 
in a pluralism that recognizes and respects the irreducible differences deﬁn-
ing individual and cultural identities.  Stahl sees such pluralism emerging 
from the application of this procedural approach to debates regarding gov-
ernment and the democratic uses of ICTs (2006, 105).  In addition, Deborah 
Wheeler (2006) documents how women in Jordan have been able to take up 
ICTs in ways that are indeed emancipatory—where ‘emancipation,’ as Stahl 
describes, emerges from the agency of local actors who seek to determine 
the meanings and practices of ‘emancipation’ that make sense and work best 
within their speciﬁc cultural frameworks and real-world contexts. Stahl’s 
critical reﬂexivity and procedural approach to deﬁning central norms such 
as “emancipation” thus issues here in praxis in “emancipation” as a pluralis-
tic concept, one that allows for diverse interpretations and implementations 
across different cultures.
Similar examples of pluralism can be noted—e.g., Maja van der Velden’s 
account of how such pluralism may be encoded in the source code of software 
used by diverse Indymedia groups around the world—such that each group 
is able to modify the software to meet local conditions and requirements, 
while preserving its main features (2007).  More broadly, I have argued that 
such pluralism can be seen at work in notions of privacy as deﬁned within 
Western contexts (using the U.S. and Germany as examples) and Eastern 
contexts (focusing primarily on China and Hong Kong).  Here, the pluralism 
at work serves to reﬂect and preserve profound differences between Western 
notions of the individual as a primary, but atomistic reality, and Confucian 
notions of the self as a relational being.  As we might expect, these dif-
ferences lead to very different data privacy protections. While limited in 
comparison with Western rights and protections (that emphasize the impor-
tance of privacy rights for individuals as rational autonomies participating 
in democratic governance), privacy rights and data privacy protections are 
nonetheless emerging in Thailand, China, and Hong Kong (justiﬁed prima-
rily as data privacy protections contribute towards economic development 
as online commerce becomes increasingly important in these economies). In 
195
this way, we again see a pluralistic, pros hen structure emerge.  Privacy and 
data privacy protection serve as the ethical focal points towards which both 
Western and Eastern societies orient their laws—but each society under-
stands and interprets the meaning of privacy and data privacy protection in 
ways that ﬁt their speciﬁc context, traditions, values, norms, practices, etc. 
(Ess 2006c). 
 As a last example, Soraj Hongladarom has taken up these apparent 
conﬂicts between Western and Eastern conceptions, with particular atten-
tion to the Buddhist traditions (Theravadan and Mahayanan) of Thai so-
ciety (2007). Hongladarom moves beyond the initial contrast between the 
Western emphasis on the atomistic individual vs. Eastern conceptions of the 
individual as a relational being (Confucian thought) or, as in Buddhism, as a 
mistaken belief altogether (one that is, indeed, at the source of human dissat-
isfaction).  Hongladarom draws on Nagarjuna’s distinction between the self 
as an empirical-conventional reality, on the one hand, and ultimate reality on 
the other: given this distinction, Buddhism is perfectly capable of endorsing 
and taking the individual self as real—at the empirical-conventional level. 
Indeed, the Buddhist striving towards Enlightenment (as the dissolution of 
the “self”) requires individual effort and responsibility—manifest, e.g., in 
the injunction to cultivate compassion towards others (Hongladarom 2007, 
118). Hence Hongladarom argues that Buddhist societies such as Thailand 
have a prima facie reason to protect the privacy of such (empirical-conven-
tional) individuals, especially as part of a movement towards establishing 
a more democratic society in Thailand.  That is, the Buddhist injunction, in 
which each person is responsible for his or her own liberation, thereby sus-
tains notions of equality and democracy that are at least closely similar to 
those developed and endorsed in Western societies. 
In my terms, there emerges here yet again an interpretive pluralism re-
garding conceptions of the self and privacy as pros hen, ethical focal points: 
in such a pluralism, modern Western notions of the self (as an ultimate real-
ity whose privacy is a positive good) and Buddhist conceptions of the self 
(as an empirical-conventional reality) are understood as diverse interpreta-
tions or understandings of focal  notions of self and privacy—and thereby as 
conceptions that may nonetheless resonate or harmonize with one another. 
Indeed, Hongladarom and I have further argued that this harmony further 
extends between the Buddhist notion of Attasammapanidhi, of ethical self-
direction and self-adjustment, and Plato’s model of the cybernetes, the pilot 
or steersman who symbolizes a similar capacity for ethical self-correction 
(Hongladarom & Ess 2007, xix).  Finally, Hongladarom points out that Bud-
dhist ethics closely resemble Western-style virtue ethics and the pragmatic 
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ethics of Richard Rorty (1975). Hongladarom’s analysis thus identiﬁes and 
reinforces a further deep resonance between Western and Eastern thought—
namely, between Western virtue ethics (whether in Socratic, Aristotelian, 
and/or contemporary feminist forms) and the ethical systems of Confucian 
thought and Buddhism.
Taken together with the previous examples of privacy East-West, the 
Thai example again marks out in praxis as well as in theory the possibility 
of a global ICE—one constituted by shared ethical focal points (i.e., shared 
norms, values, etc.) that are nonetheless articulated and instantiated in di-
verse ways as these focal points are interpreted and applied in distinctive 
cultural contexts.
Emerging Rights / Duties?
In light of the theoretical foundations and practical expressions of pros 
hen or focal pluralism in an emerging and genuinely global ICE, what rights 
and obligations might emerge as we take up ICTs more and more into the 
fabric of our lives?
I can see three layers of responses to this question.
1. Irresoluble conﬂict 
While multiple instances demonstrate the possibility of resolving ethical 
differences within a pluralistic resonance or harmony—manifestly, not all 
such conﬂicts will allow for such resolutions.  So, for example, Dan Burk 
(2007) documents the intractable differences between U.S. and European 
Union approaches to copyright—with the U.S., property-oriented approach 
currently dominating over the E.U., author-oriented approach.  Similarly, 
Pirongrong Ramasoota Rananand suggests that the tradition and afﬁliated 
customs of the Thai “surveillance state” may succeed in keeping “privacy” 
an interesting idea, but not a right articulated and defended in law (2007).
2. Minimal requirements—shared commonalities.
Again, it is possible to begin our encounters with one another globally 
via ICTs with the straightforward quest for commonalities, including a set 
of minimal rights and obligations towards one another, justiﬁed at least by 
shared economic interests (Søraker 2007). What emerges from this approach 
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is what Westerners will recognize as familiar but primarily negative obliga-
tions: don’t violate another person’s privacy, right to intellectual property, 
etc.—by not sharing passwords and/or hacking where you don’t belong, 
copying illegally, etc. 
3. Maximal requirements: meeting “the Other” online
More broadly, our emerging and global ICE depends very much on how 
far we want / will / need / ought to go in meeting “the Other” online.  Pre-
suming that we seek to meet with and engage “the Other” in a more robust 
way—i.e., one deﬁned by our willingness to acknowledge not only com-
monalities but also the irreducible differences that deﬁne our individual and 
cultural identities—we are apparently required to move to a more complex 
mode of thinking and behaving, one shaped precisely by the structures of 
pluralism and harmony.
To move in these more robust directions, we can perhaps draw at least 
initial guidance from the following considerations.
Cross-cultural communication ethics
Broadly speaking, two of the most important factors of successful cross-
cultural communication that sustains the irreducible differences deﬁning 
individual and cultural identities are trust and the ability to recognize and 
effectively respond to the linguistic ambiguity that thereby allows for a plu-
ralistic understanding of basic terms and norms as holding different inter-
pretations or applications in diverse cultures (Ess and Thorseth, 2006).  Such 
pluralism allows precisely for a structure of both shared commonalities and 
irreducibly different understandings and practices that emerge from our dis-
tinctive cultures: thereby, pluralism and ambiguity are necessary conditions 
for cross-cultural encounters with one another that preserve these irreduc-
ible differences as part of the resonance that describes such engagements. 
Unfortunately, these dimensions of trust, ambiguity, and resonance may be 
hindered rather than fostered by online environments (cf. Søraker 2006; 
Grodzinsky & Tavani 2007).  
Moreover, these elements of human communication ﬁnally require the 
now familiar work of judgment—beginning with judgments as to how far or 
close one’s meaning is understood by “the Other,” and in turn, how far one 
understands the meanings of the Other: even though we may use the same 
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word or term, their differences in our diverse cultural settings require very 
careful attention and judgment to determine whether or not we are sliding 
into equivocation and mis-understanding. But: earning and sustaining trust, 
successfully recognizing and comfortably negotiating linguistic ambiguities, 
and utilizing the needed judgment in establishing and sustaining resonant 
relationships that preserve our irreducible differences—these capacities are 
not easily captured in analytical frameworks, much less taught in any formal 
way. They can, of course, be learned through example and experience with 
embodied teachers: but this again means that the most important elements 
of successful cross-cultural communication may not be best learned in the 
disembodied context of contemporary online venues (cf. Dreyfus, 2001).
Information justice and the cultivation of character?
Numerous writers have argued the rights-based approaches of the West 
will not work well in “other” cultures. As we have seen, such approaches 
emphasize the autonomous individual as distinct from the larger community. 
Such an approach sharply contrasts with the basic assumptions regarding 
the individual as a relational being that shape the more communitarian / 
collectively-oriented cultures and traditions of Africa, indigenous peoples, 
those countries shaped by Confucian and Buddhist traditions, etc. (Cf. van 
der Velden 2007, 83). For his part, Hongladarom argues that the more radical 
Buddhist solution to the problem of protecting privacy is not simply to erect 
laws and create technological safeguards: it is rather to attack the root cause 
of our motivations to violate privacy in the ﬁrst place—namely, egoism and 
its afﬁliated greed (2007, 120f.) 
Conclusion
In short, a global ICE that seeks to move beyond shared commonalities 
(and comparatively negative) requirements will apparently call upon us to 
take up a range of positive obligations and duties, as these are required if 
we are to preserve irreducible differences while simultaneously engaging in 
dialogue with “the Other.”  Happily, these positive obligations and duties are 
not entirely foreign to the Western traditions: both ancient and contemporary 
feminist virtue ethics and ethics of care move us in these directions, as do the 
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deontological ethics of Kant and others. 
As we work—individually and collectively, and especially cross-cultur-
ally to develop a global ICE, part of our response, as I hope I’ve shown with 
some clarity, depends on how we respond to a central question:
 how far am I prepared to go today—i.e., how well am I prepared to take 
up relationships with “the Other” that entail not simply comparatively 
straightforward commonalities and pragmatic agreements, 
 but further entail the difﬁcult efforts to understand and negotiate ambigu-
ity and irreducible difference, precisely in the name of preserving indi-
vidual and cultural differences—
 perhaps, as Paterson argues, even preserving the environment 
 where such negotiations will require the skills—learned only slowly and 
over a lifetime—of judgment, 
 and the cultivation of compassion and care?
Again, the cultivation of such virtues is not entirely alien to Western tra-
ditions: on the contrary, I have argued elsewhere for the necessity of an 
education that fosters Socratic critical thinking and moral autonomy, as key 
to moving beyond one’s own culture towards a more encompassing under-
standing of a wide diversity of cultures—a movement captured in Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave, and further exempliﬁed in our notions of Renaissance 
women and men who attain multiple cultural, linguistic, and communicative 
ﬂuencies that allow them to comfortably live and work with “Others” around 
the globe.  Contra “cultural tourists” and “cultural consumers” whose eth-
nocentrism may only be reinforced rather than challenged by their online 
engagements, such a Socratic-Renaissance education would further foster, 
following Habermas and feminism, an empathic perspective-taking and 
solidarity with one’s dialogical partners—including our sister and fellow 
cosmo-politans (world citizens). Of course, such education aims towards 
the development of phronesis, the practical wisdom required to negotiate 
the multiple contexts of ethics and politics, with the goal of achieving eu-
daimonia, human contentment, and harmony in one’s own society and the 
larger world (Ess 2004, 164).  And, in terms that have emerged here, such an 
education would further highlight the importance of moving beyond prag-
matic commonalities and shared economic interests to the pluralism of the 
cybernetes, the one who is able to discern what ethical course to pursue in a 
speciﬁc context—including the often radically diverse contexts of irreduc-
ibly distinct cultures—and who is able to correct her errors when they are 
made.  Resonant with Socratic, Aristotelian, and feminist virtue ethics, such 
an education would further seek to foster the virtues of compassion and care. 
Such compassion and care are essential to healing the ruptures that follow 
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upon our inevitable mistakes in our efforts to understand, work, and live 
with “the Other” –most especially as we venture out into new linguistic and 
cultural settings.  Such compassion and care, ﬁnally, are essential to building 
and sustaining the trust essential to all human interactions. 
ICTs continue their apparently inexorable expansion throughout the 
world—meaning, they are taken up by more and more people in diverse cul-
tural contexts and settings. It seems certain that if we are to avoid a homog-
enous world culture—what Benjamin Barber famously called “McWorld” 
(1995)—more and more of us will need to take up the moral postures and 
communication skills of the cybernetes, rather than simply pursuing com-
monalities, pragmatics, and economic self-interest.  Perhaps the dramatic 
scope and speed of cross-cultural encounters made possible precisely by 
ICTs might help more and more people recognize the need for such exem-
plary ethics and cultivation of character: but such hopes, of course, must 
recognize the multiple ways in which most of our online engagements rather 
foster the minimal obligations entailed by seeking out simply shared inter-
ests and pragmatic commonalities, especially as these engagements are ori-
ented towards easy consumption. 
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